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I. INTRODUCTION
A. COMMENT THEME AND FRAMEWORK
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION has long been rec-
I gnized as a valuable tool in facilitating the free flow of
trade.1 Procedures such as arbitration, mediation, and consulta-
tion. save both the costs and time normally associated with litiga-
tion.2 Accordingly, the American business perspective has
strongly advocated the use of ADR in international commercial
disputes.'
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 4 con-
tains a unique set of ADR procedures to aid in its implementa-
tion. These procedures provide for several levels of dispute
resolution depending upon both the nature of the controversy
and whether the dispute is one between one of the following:
1. Parties to the Agreement;5
2. A Party (or Parties) to the Agreement and a private party;6 or
3. Private parties.
7
This comment examines the dispute resolution procedures
provided by NAFTA in each of the three instances outlined
above. Following each examination, this comment covers what
role the dispute resolution procedures may have in allowing the
United States and U.S.-based airlines to manipulate NAFTA pro-
visions to their advantage. Since most lawyers and investors have
directed their attention southward, this comment focuses pri-
marily on the prospect of U.S.-based airlines desiring to move
into Mexico. After discussing the potential for abuse brought
about by the NAFTA dispute resolution provisions, the com-




4 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA or Agreement].
5 Definitions for terms used in the Agreement are set out in chapter two. Id. at
ch. 2. Although "Party" is not explicitly defined in chapter 2, "Party" clearly re-
fers to the governments of Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Id. at pmbl.
Thus, provisions relating to a "Party" do not implicate private parties or individu-
als without explicit reference.
6 Id. at pmbl.
7 Id.
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ment suggests a number of motivating factors that may have in-
fluenced the United States during the bargaining stage, of
NAFTA.
B. MEXICO'S DISADVANTAGE
Generally, formal dispute settlement procedures serve to facil-
itate the functioning and legitimacy of trade agreements. With-
out formal mechanisms, there is always the risk that a party to
the agreement will become dissatisfied and withdraw from the
agreement.8 A party may use the threat of withdrawal as a bar-
gaining tool in the dispute settlement process. But a party that
entered into the agreement out of necessity has little bargaining
power and cannot make such a threat, for by withdrawal, the
party loses the benefit of the agreement.
Having entered NAFTA out of necessity, Mexico has little lev-
erage in the bargaining process. Fortunately, the Parties to
NAFTA established a formal settlement mechanism to govern all
disputes under the Agreement.9 There is still much room for
alarm, however, on the part of Mexico. While the Parties sought
to alleviate the effects of the disparity of bargaining power be-
tween Mexico and its northern neighbor by creating a mecha-
nism for the formal settlement of disputes, the same disparity
existed during the negotiations of the Agreement.' ° It follows
that most provisions of the Agreement, including the dispute
8 See 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International
Context: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. REV. 2175, 2176
(1993).
9 The Parties most likely recognized the need for a formal dispute settlement
mechanism based on Canada's experience with the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement. Canada's Deputy Attorney General made the following re-
marks while negotiating the bilateral agreement:
We have done pretty well in the past [at resolving trade disputes],
but there are two reasons that ... have kept us from doing better.
The first is what I would call the level playing field reason. This
reason recognizes that the negotiating strengths of the two parties
are not equal ... [M]echanisms to solve disputes are vital to Can-
ada. The existence of such mechanisms are going to make or break
the issue in Canada. Quite apart from the substantive disagree-
ments, any agreement without a satisfactory dispute resolution
mechanism will not be acceptable. We cannot have a system that
will see differences resolved on the basis of raw power.
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Comments on Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free
Trade Agreement, 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 337, 337 (1987).
10 SeeJohnson, supra note 8, at 2176.
1996] 993
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
settlement provisions, should contain, at the very least, a subtle
advantage in favor of the United States.
One such advantage may be found in the very type of dispute
resolution mechanism upon which the Parties to NAFTA eventu-
ally agreed. As will be discussed later, the dispute resolution
provisions agreed upon by the negotiators of NAFTA are prag-
matic in nature. Rather than subject controversies to hardfast
rules and binding judgments, the provisions allow the Parties to
settle disputes through less rigid means, namely consultation
and negotiation. Two other types of dispute resolution provi-
sions, ones which would safeguard fair treatment for Mexico,
were proposed but struck down during the negotiation stage of
NAFTA. 11 A study group made up of representatives from each
member state first proposed that the Agreement establish a per-
manent trilateral tribunal comprised of an equal number of rep-
resentatives from each Party.12 If a Party were to submit a
complaint that placed the interpretation of the Agreement at
issue, the tribunal would have jurisdiction and its decision would
be binding.1 3 The study group also proposed that the Agree-
ment provide for binding arbitration in the event of a dispute. 4
The NAFTA negotiators disregarded both proposals, however,
and Mexico is now left to the perils of consultation to settle dis-
putes.15 Clearly, Mexico needs binding decisions in order to
protect its interests. Without a binding mechanism, Parties may
be less committed to complying with arbitrated decisions. As
the Party with the most to lose, Mexico bears the greatest risk of
non-compliance.
C. HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS: THIRD WORLD VS.
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS
NAFTA is unprecedented in that it is the first regional trade
agreement between a third world nation and two industrialized
nations.1 6 This uniqueness should, however, raise suspicion
11 Jos6 L. Siqueiros, NAFTA Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Pro-
cedures, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 383, 393 (1993).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 393-94.
15 Id. at 394. Siqueiros notes, "[I]t appears that the recommendations by the
three Bars did not receive the blessing of the negotiators. The proposal of a
Standing Tribunal was disregarded, as well as the alternative of binding arbitra-
tion as provided in Chapter 18 of the U.S.-Canada FTA." Id.
16 Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment
in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 261-62 (1994).
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since it marks a surrender of the third world investment ideals
that have persisted for nearly a half century.17 The very nature
of this surrender indicates a sense of desperation which, in turn,
leads to the making of concessions. One such concession is
manifested in Mexico's agreeing to be bound by the dispute res-
olution process of NAFTA. To understand "why," it is first nec-
essary to understand the longstanding struggle between third
world and industrialized nations on the issue of direct foreign
investment.
Following World War II, a division developed between third
world nations and industrialized nations concerning the rights
of a state with respect to foreign investment within its territory. 8
Industrialized nations like the United States held fast to the
traditional rules of international law, which asserted that foreign
investors possessed contractual rights which superseded the
state's right to full sovereignty.1 9 Developing countries, on the
other hand, felt that they were entitled to treat foreign invest-
ment within their respective territories as they wished, meaning
with "full sovereignty."2"
One development that aggravated the tension between third
world and industrialized nations was the influx of transnational
corporations during the 1960s. 21 A transnational corporation
based in an industrialized nation could place a subsidiary within
the territory of a third world country and prevent that country
Sandrino, in classifying Mexico as a "Third World" country, makes the following
observation:
'Third World states' or 'developing states' consist of a diverse
group. Although Mexico is often referred to as a 'newly industrial-
ized state,' it is still part of the Third World. Third World states,
including the newly industrialized states, perceive that their solidar-
ity is necessary because industrialized states have taken advantage
of them in the past.
Id. at 262 n.2.
17 Id. at 262. For example, chapter 11 of NAFTA, which deals with interna-
tional investment, establishes a liberalized investment regime that expands the
protection of foreign investors and investment. Most of the provisions in chapter
11, although considered traditional rules of international law among industrial-
ized nations, had been successfully opposed or challenged by Mexico prior to
NAFTA. Id.
18 id. at 262-63.
19 Id. at 263.
20 Id.
21 Id. Sandrino, in her analysis, defines a transnational corporation as "a busi-
ness enterprise composed of a parent company and one or more subsidiaries
located in two or more states, organized for the conduct of profitable interna-
tional production and provision of goods and services." Id.
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from "fully addressing" the corporation.2 2 To alleviate the prob-
lem, third world countries, in 1974, passed the United Nations
General Assembly resolutions on the "Establishment of a New
International Economic Order" (NIEO).23 Through the NIEO,
third world countries persuaded the United Nations to adopt
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Charter of
Economic Rights or Charter).24
The Charter of Economic Rights merely codified what devel-
oping nations, particularly those in Latin America, had tradi-
tionally asserted as their rights with respect to direct foreign
investment. Article 2 of the Charter gave each country the right
to regulate foreign investment within its territory.25 Most nota-
ble, however, was article 2's recognition of a country's right to
nationalize foreign owned property within its territory.26 This,
of course, was to be done with adequate compensation v.2  But
the determination of what was "adequate" was a question of do-
mestic rather than international law.2 8 Article 2 further pro-
vided that domestic judicial and arbitration procedures would
govern all disputes relating to foreign investments9.2  Develop-
ing countries thus were granted significant control over foreign
investment activities.
The measures of article 2, however, were by no means unfa-
miliar to industrialized nations and the struggle with developing
countries was in no way different than before. Like all Latin
American countries, Mexico had written article 2-type provisions
into its constitution long before the implementation of the
Charter of Economic Rights. 0 Known as "Calvo Clauses," such
provisions had concerned the United States and its Latin Ameri-
22 Id. at 271.
23 Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Agenda Item 7, Supp. No. 6, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
Res/3202 (1974).
24 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.






30 CONSTrrUcI6N PoLrrcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 27 (1917),
reprinted in CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD at 23 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1988). See also Tomas A. Clayton et al., Foreign
Investment in Mexico: Mexico Welcomes Foreign Investors, 12 CHIcANO-LATINo L. REV.
13, 20-21 (1992).
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can investment interests since the end of the nineteenth
century.3 '
One can see the significant concessions that Mexico has al-
ready made in agreeing to be bound by the dispute resolution
procedures of NAFTA. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution'
of 1917, which contains its own Calvo Clause,32 would most likely
continue to be in effect if it were not for the economic ills which
developed in Mexico following the crash of its petroleum indus-
try.33 By entering NAFTA, Mexico has surrendered its national-
ist policies to the traditional policies of international law which
the United States has supported for the last century.
D. SIGNS OF DANGER: PRAGMATISM VS. LEGALISM
Discussions of international dispute resolution frequently in-
volve a comparison of legalism versus pragmatism:
34
Legalism refers to a model ofdispute settlement designed above
all, to produce compliance with treaty norms. A truly legalistic or
"rule-oriented" system involves a formal adjudicatory decision-
making process and a strict enforcement mechanism. Pragma-
tism, on the other hand, refers to a more flexible model,
designed primarily to facilitate negotiations between treaty part-
ners. In a pragmatic system, decisions are made by consensus of
the parties, and enforcement measures are intended to en-
courage further negotiations rather than to coerce compliance.
31
In general, the dispute resolution provisions of NAFTA are
pragmatic in nature. The provisions leave substantial room for
negotiation which, at first glance, seems to be a positive attri-
bute. The problem with the provisions is that, when looking at
them from the perspective of a weaker party, there is cause for
alarm at losing out in the bargaining process. Mexico, finan-
31 Clayton, supra note 30, at 20-21.
32 CONsTrrucI6N PoLrrICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXIcANos art. 27.
33 As Sandrino notes, "On August 20, 1982, Mexico announced that it could
no longer service its debt. This debt crisis severely constrained Mexico's ability to
pursue the economic nationalist policies of the past. Accordingly, this crisis has
been one of the most significant factors in the turnaround of Mexican economic
policy." Sandrino, supra note 16, at 300 (footnotes omitted).
34 David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 407, 407-08 (1993). See Kenneth W. Abbott, The
Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System of Justice,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111 (1992).
35 Huntington, supra note 34, at 408 (footnotes omitted).
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cially, is the weaker party to NAFTA.36 Conversely, the United
States, which has more to give and less to gain relative to Mex-
ico, is the stronger party and thus has the greater bargaining
power. Consequently, the United States and U.S.-based airlines
may have ample opportunity to manipulate the NAFTA dispute
resolution provisions to their advantage.
II. DISPUTES BETWEEN PARTIES TO NAFTA
A. PROCEDURES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Scholars have written extensively on the dispute resolution
proVisions of NAFTA. As a result, numerous works have already
provided detailed analyses of the procedures that Parties in a
dispute must undergo, 37 making it unnecessary for this com-
ment to examine the procedures in detail. In brief, all disputes
between Parties, other than anti-dumping and countervailing
duty disputes, are governed by chapter 20.38 In the event of a
dispute, Parties are not free to pursue any other means of dis-
pute resolution beyond the NAFTA framework; rather, Parties
must resort to the procedures of chapter 20.
The dispute resolution process under chapter 20 consists of
four stages. First, the Parties enter into consultations for thirty
days.40 Second, if the consultations are unsuccessful, the Free
Trade Commission (FTC) handles the dispute (upon proper
written request from a Party) and may use any number of ADR
methods to further a negotiated settlement, including experts,
good offices, conciliation, mediation, or other similar dispute
resolution mechanisms.41 The FTC then makes a non-binding
recommendation to the disputing Parties.42 Third, if the FTC's
36 In 1989, the United States had a gross national product of $5.2 trillion-10
times the size of Canada's at $530 billion, and 25 times the size of Mexico's at
$201 billion (values in U.S. dollars). Johnson, supra note 8, at 2177 n.7.
37 For a thorough discussion of NAFTA dispute resolution procedures, see
Kristin L. Oelstrom, A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the
NAFTA, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783 (1994); David A. Gantz, Resolution of In-
vestment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 335 (1993); Huntington, supra note 34; Siqueiros, supra note 11.
38 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2004. According to the language of article 2004,
"the dispute settlement provisions of this Chapter shall apply with respect to the
avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regarding the inter-
pretation and the application of this Agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 Id. arts. 2006-2007.
41 Id. art. 2007.
42 Id. art. 2007(5) (c).
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recommendation fails to resolve the dispute, and there is an-
other written request by a Party, the Parties enter into confiden-
tial arbitration proceedings before an arbitral panel created by
the FTC.43 The panel issues an initial report to the Parties with
recommendations, to which the Parties may respond by furnish-
ing separate opinions or submitting written briefs.44 The panel,
after further deliberation, then issues a final report.45 Fourth,
the Parties are essentially left to their own volition in deciding
whether or not to comply with the panel's final resolution.46 If a
Party wishes not to comply, it may instead pay appropriate com-
pensation. 47 If neither appropriate compensation nor compli-
ance is rendered, the Party seeking compliance may, but is not
required to, suspend equivalent benefits from the non-con-
forming party "until such time as they have reached agreement
on a resolution of the dispute."48 Chapter 20 contains no provi-
sion requiring any NAFTA body to monitor the Parties' actions
during the implementation stage.
B. PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT AS CAUSE FOR ALARM
It is clear that the NAFTA dispute resolution provisions are
designed to encourage the Parties to settle disputes between
themselves; rather than rely on binding orders from another
body. While the FTC does facilitate the settlement process by
issuing recommendations and establishing arbitral panels, it
does not force the Parties to adopt any particular resolution.
One scholar suggests that the promotion of settlement "is in
many ways inconsistent with the proper role of a community
whose goal is to assist its members to realize their private inter-
ests."49 The argument is that dispute resolution mechanisms
"promote compromise settlements which often do not conform
with the normative rules of a legal regime .... [and which'] will
work to undermine the legal framework necessary for an effec-
tive system of economic integration."50 Through compromise
settlements, "one may be able to profit by ignoring social
43 Id. art. 2008.
- Id. art. 2016(2)-(4).
45 Id. art. 2017(1).
46 Id. art. 2018(1). The Parties are merely directed to agree on a resolution
which, according to the Agreement, "normally shall conform with the determina-
tions and recommendations of the panel." Id.
47 Id. art. 2018(2).
48 1& art. 2019(1).
49 Abbott, supra note 34, at 124.
o Huntington, supra note 34, at'418.
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norms."5 ' By encouraging settlement, the FTC runs the risk that
Mexico's societal norms will be ignored in the process.
This cause for alarm may be somewhat unfounded, however,
since Parties are not free to pursue settlement procedures be-
yond the NAFTA framework. The FTC is the only body which
can conduct the various alternative dispute resolution meth-
ods.5 2 Settlement procedures, which must be conducted within
the framework of the Agreement, may "result in stricter adher-
ence to the agreement's legal norms."5 3
In addition to the FTC's exclusive jurisdiction, it is arguable
that the procedure for choosing an arbitral panel under chapter
20 safeguards any opportunity for abuse during arbitration.
NAFTA mandates that the arbitral panel consist of five qualified
and independent individuals-a chairperson agreed upon by
the disputing Parties, and a body of four panelists formed by
each disputing Party choosing two persons who are citizens of
the other disputing Party's country. 4 The selection procedure
arguably provides for a non-partisan panel since the Parties are
unable to choose their own citizens as panelists. Furthermore,
each Party to a dispute chooses an equal number of panelists,
which should provide for a level playing field.
Still, as one scholar notes, some opportunity exists for parti-
sanship to emerge through the selection process:
Arbitrators appointed at the sole discretion of one party will
often be appointed because their views on an important question
are known and favor the appointing party. When this happens, a
party-appointed arbitrator can end up acting more as an advo-
cate than as a judge. Strictly speaking, an arbitrator appointed
because of his views on a particular question does not violate his
obligation of independence either by accepting the appointment
or by acting consistently with those views in the arbitration.
Whenever a party makes such an appointment, however, the obli-
gation of independence is violated in spirit because the ap-
pointing party has, in effect, "packed the court," and has done so
after being put on notice of precisely what the important ques-
tions in the arbitration will be.5
51 Abbott, supra note 34, at 123.
52 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007.
53 Huntington, supra note 34, at 419.
54 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2011(1). The selection procedure described in
the text assumes that only two Parties are involved in the dispute. The procedure
varies slightly if three Parties are involved. Id. art. 2011(2).
55 Johnson, supra note 8, at 2187 (footnotes omitted).
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Also, the opportunity to appoint an equal number of arbitral
panel members does not necessarily ensure a level playing field.
Assuming that both parties appoint their members on the basis
of whether or not the members would serve as advocates, the
crucial decision-maker then becomes the chair of the panel.
The chair is chosen by consensus or, in more realistic terms, by
negotiation. Whom the chair will serve as an advocate for conse-
quently hinges upon the bargaining power. of the parties, and
the United States will certainly have the advantage.56
Also problematic is the fact that a Party seeking compliance
with an arbitral report is not required to suspend equivalent
benefits. This becomes a problem when considering the struc-
ture of the Mexican government, particularly the unchecked
power of the executive branch. By explicit constitutional grant,
the executive branch has the power "to promulgate and execute
the laws... [of] Congress providing for their exact enforcement
in their administrative sphere. 57 The executive branch utilizes
this power by issuing regulations designed to explain the laws
enacted by the Mexican Congress.5 Accordingly, "[s] ince most
statutes are actually explained and supplemented in this man-
ner, this power to interpret the laws, normally exercised by the
courts in the United States, provides the Mexican federal execu-
tive with a powerful tool to dictate the direction of the laws." 9
Thus, whether Mexico as a Party to NAFTA will act when the
United States or a U.S. investor violates Mexico's foreign invest-
ment laws is a decision left up to the executive branch, namely
the Mexican President. It is conceivable that if the United States
does not wish to comply with a report, it may use political influ-
ence to persuade Mexico's executive branch to refrain from sus-
pending benefits.
Lastly, the opportunity to submit a written response may pro-
mote unfair bargaining. Such a measure could constitute an
outright intervention into the panel's independence. It would
allow the "[p]arties to give preventive warnings and to exert
pointed pressures on the panel members." 60 Pressure from the
56 Id. at 2188.
57 Clayton, supra note 30, at 19 (quoting CONSTITUCI6N POLIrICA DE LOS Es-
TADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 89 (1917).
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 Abbott, supra note 34, at 134 (quoting Pierre Pescatore, former judge of the
European Court of Justice).
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United States could prove very effective, considering its bargain-
ing strength.
C. PRAGMATISM AS A SOURCE OF DANGER FOR MEXICO
Before considering the specific NAFTA provisions relating to
the airline industry in State-to-State matters, one may look to the
pragmatism of chapter 20 as a general source of danger for Mex-
ico. The very nature of the bargaining between the countries
places Mexico at a disadvantage in NAFTA's pragmatic dispute
settlement process.
In a highly legalistic regime, negotiation between states generally
takes place in the shadow of the law. Bargaining power flows
from the [P]arties' respective legal rights, and negotiated settle-
ments tend to conform to treaty norms. In a more pragmatic
regime, on the other hand, states are less constrained by legal
norms. Bargaining power flows to a greater extent from extrale-
gal sources, such as the relative political and economic strengths
of the [P] arties, and settlements are more likely to depart from
treaty norms.... [T] he danger' is that a Party with weaker polit-
ical or economic bargaining power will be coerced into accepting
a compromise not fully reflective of its legal rights under the
Agreement. It is conceivable ... that Mexico could find itself
forced to compromise with the United States during the course
of a [C]hapter 20 proceeding, solely on account of its relative
economic weakness.61
It is interesting to note that most multilateral trade agree-
ments provide for a more legalistic mechanism, such as binding
arbitration, in the settlement of disputes. The European Eco-'
nomic Community,62 the Andean Pact,63 and the Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association64 all have binding arbitration
procedures. Curiously, the Parties to NAFTA chose not to sub-
ject themselves to binding orders when a conflict occurs be-
tween member states. Whereas Latin American and European
countries have been willing to accept binding orders, the United
61 Huntington, supra note 34, at 426-27.
62 Treaty Establishing the European Eco nomic Community (Treaty of Rome),
Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 169-177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 75-77 (1958).
63 Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28,
1979, arts. 17-22, ch. 3, translation reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1203, 1206 (1979); Agree-
ment on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, arts. 5-24, ch. 2, transla-
tion repinted in 8 I.L.M. 910, 911-16 (1969).
64 Protocol Establishing the Final Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes
Within LAFTA, Sept. 2, 1967, translation reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 747-56 (1968).
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States has refused to do so in all free trade pacts with which it
has been affiliated.
D. RELEVANCE TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The relevant NAFTA provisions regarding the airline industry
between Mexico and the United States consist of only two reser-
vations. On the one hand, Mexico has reserved the exclusive
right to develop, operate, or perform the control, inspection,
and surveillance of airports and heliports.65 On the other hand,
the United States has reserved that the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration must certify aircraft repair stations performing work on
U.S.-registered aircraft."6 If the United States were to infringe
upon Mexico's reservation, the following dispute process would
ensue: (1) consultations (since disputes under NAFTA must be
resolved under chapter 20); (2) referral to the FTC; (3) arbitra-
tion and an initial report; (4) written responses to the initial
report; and (5) issuance of a non-binding final report.67
After the issuance of a final, non-binding report, the Parties
need only agree on a resolution which "normally" conforms with
the panel's report.6" But if control of an airport or heliport is of
sufficient importance to the United States, it would not have to
comply with the report. Mexico could then withhold equivalent
benefits, but in terms of airline provisions, the only relevant
benefit is the U.S. certification of inspection stations. 69 Thus,
Mexico would arguably have very little to withhold in compari-
son to the benefits acquired by the United States.
III. DISPUTES BETWEEN A PARTY (OR PARTIES) TO
THE AGREEMENT AND A PRIVATE PARTY
A. PROCEDURES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Disputes between a Party (or Parties) to the Agreement and a
private party are governed primarily by chapter 11, section B of
NAFTA.70 Resolution of those disputes, like disputes between
65 NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex III(A) (11).
66 Id. Annex I, at 867 (Schedule of the United States).
67 See discussion supra part III.A.
68 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2018(1).
69 There is some question as to whether equivalent benefits refers to benefits
of the same nature or subject matter, or whether it refers to benefits within the
entire agreement, regardless of the subject matter involved in the dispute. In an
airline industry dispute, it seems reasonable that, to suspend equivalent benefits,
a Party would have to suspend a benefit involving an airline industry provision.70 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1115.
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Parties to the Agreement, begins with consultations.7 1 If a claim
cannot be resolved through consultations, the disputing parties
are required to choose between litigation or arbitration. 2 Once
the investor has made this selection and initiated the claim, the
investor may not resort to the other procedure. If arbitration is
chosen, any award made by an arbitral tribunal is binding on the
disputing parties.7" If a party fails to abide by the final award,
the party whose investor prevailed may request the establish-
ment of an arbitral panel under the provisions of chapter 20.71
B. RELEVANCE TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The relevant NAFTA provisions regarding the airline industry
in disputes between a Party (or Parties) and a private party are
more numerous than those pertaining to disputes between Par-
ties. With regard to Mexico, chapter 11 of NAFTA provides that
investors of another Party may own directly or indirectly no
more than twenty-five percent of the voting interest in a Mexi-
can enterprise providing commercial air services. 75 The chair-
man and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and two-
thirds of the managing officers of such enterprise must be Mexi-
can nationals.76 Furthermore, only Mexican registered aircraft
can provide commercial air transport services domestically and
from points within Mexico to other countries.77
With regard to the United States, "in order to perform work
on U.S.-registered aircraft, foreign air repair stations must be
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with continuing
oversight provided by the Federal Aviation Administration." 78
Also, a U.S. air carrier must be under the actual control of U.S.
citizens.79 But non-U.S. citizens may own and control foreign air
carriers that operate between the U.S. and foreign points.8 0
The opportunity for abuse on the part of the United States or
U.S. investors under the above provisions can be traced, once
again, to superior bargaining power. Certainly any party is at a
71 Id. art. 1118.
72 Id. art. 1119.
73 Id. art. 1136(1).
74 Id. art. 1136(5).
75 Id. Annex I (Schedule of Mexico).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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disadvantage when, after choosing between litigation or arbitra-
tion, it may not go back on its decision. It seems that in all cases
arbitration would be the most attractive dispute resolution
mechanism. For a U.S. party investing in the Mexican airline
industry, however, this may not be the case. Through an effec-
tive choice-of-law clause, a U.S. investor may secure the best of
both worlds: (1) a Mexican tribunal applying U.S. law; or (2) an
arbitral panel under NAFTA. With the bargaining power of U.S.
investors, this two-sided advantage may be present in all invest-
ment contracts.
IV, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES BETWEEN
PRIVATE PARTIES
A. PROCEDURES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Essentially, NAFTA will not apply to private commercial dis-
putes. Article 2022 does refer to private commercial disputes,
but fails to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism under
the Agreement. Article 2022 states:
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, en-
courage and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of
alternative dispute resolution for the settlement of international
commercial disputes between private parties in the free trade
area.
81
2. To this end, each Party shall provide appropriate proce-
dures to ensure observance of agreements to arbitrate and for
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in such
disputes.8 2
3. A Party shall be deemed to be in compliance with para-
graph 2 if it is a party to and is in compliance with the 1958
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards83 or the 1975 Inter-American Convention on In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration.8 4
4. The Commission shall establish an Advisory Committee on
Private Commercial Disputes comprising persons with expertise
or experience in the resolution of private international commer-
cial disputes. The Committee shall report and provide recom-
mendations to the Commission on general issues referred to it by
81 Id. art. 2022(1).
82 Id. art. 2022(2).
83 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter New York Convention].
Both the United States and Mexico have ratified the New York Convention.
84 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2022(3).
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the Commission respecting the availability, use and effectiveness
of arbitration and other procedures for the resolution of such
disputes in the free trade area.8 5
B. RELEVANCE TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Private parties do not have standing under the Agreement to
bring claims against another private party. 6 In order to utilize
the dispute resolution procedures of NAFTA, a private party
must convince its government to pursue the claim against the
other member government or governments, thus giving rise to
the following problem:
[T] he interests of governments do not always coincide with those
of individual constituents. There may be instances in which a
government would prefer not to espouse an individual's claim
under the Agreement, even if that claim were wholly valid on
substantive grounds. Under chapter 20, that government will
have considerable flexibility in its course of action .... In any
event, there is a serious risk that the legitimate interests of the
individual will not be adequately represented. 7
Claims will proceed just as they have in the past, with U.S. courts
reluctant to hear claims by Mexican nationals"" and Mexican
tribunals applying U.S. law.8 9
85 Id. art. 2022(4).
86 Note, however, that "recommendations are in place for international com-
mercial arbitration which will facilitate the use of arbitration in the case of private
disputes within the free trade zone." Siqueiros, supra note 11, at 386.
87 Huntington, supra note 34, at 429.
88 See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993). In De Aguilar, a
plane manufactured by Boeing, an American company, crashed in Mexico killing
all aboard. When the Mexican plaintiffs attempted to find recourse in a U.S.
court for the loss of their family members, they were greeted with the following
response: "The plaintiffs in this case are doggedly determined to find some court
in the United States-any court-in which to try their foreign based claims.
Once again they fail." Id. at 56.
89 See Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, 930 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied 115 S. Ct. 481 (1994).
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V. POSSIBLE MOTIVATING FACTORS ON THE PART OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR SECURING AN
ADVANTAGE IN THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Clearly, the United States has much to gain by the implemen-
tation of NAFTA. 90 This is especially true in areas such as the
airline industry where the United States has reported significant
losses in recent years. Between 1990 and 1993, United States
airline industry losses exceeded ten billion dollars,9' placing
U.S.-based airlines in a state of crisis while NAFTA was being
negotiated. The possibility that NAFTA could have been viewed
as a potential vehicle for pulling the airline industry out of its
state of crisis is a strong one. Any increase in trade through
NAFTA would result in greater air transport between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada.92 With the United States strategi-
cally located between the other two member countries, U.S.-
based airlines stood to gain the most from this increase in trans-
portation and commerce.93 The U.S. government also would
have to rely on the airline industry to secure the benefits of the
increased trade which inevitably would follow under the Agree-
ment. Consequently, the well-being of U.S.-based airlines must
have been a major concern for the United States government
during the negotiation stage of NAFTA.
90 As an example, one may consider estimated figures for the pharmaceutical
industry. In 1991, the United States exported $138 million worth of
pharmaceuticals to Mexico, while Mexico's export level to the United States was
measured at $86 million. U.S INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2596, POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 5.2, 9-1 (1993). Through NAFTA, United States exports
are expected to rise by 12% in the long term; Mexican exports, however, are
projected to rise by only 3%. Id. at 9-2, 9-4. This contrast is simply another illus-
tration of the disparity in benefits between the United States and Mexico under
the Agreement.
91 Airline Regulation; The War in the Skies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1993, at 66.
92 Freight and cargo transport are not the only types of traffic that should be
associated with increased air activity due to a free trade agreement. According to
one article, "[i]n the United States, travel and tourism has become the nation's
leading export. In 1990, the industry generated $52.8 billion in expenditures
from almost 40 million international visitors. The health and continued expan-
sion of travel and tourism depends a great deal upon the availability of affordable
and convenient air transportation." Daniel C. Hedlund, Note, Toward Open Skies:
Liberalizing Trade in International Airline Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 276
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
93 As of 1992, 38.8% of the world's air traffic already took place in the United
States. Joan M. Feldman, No Guts, No Glmy, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Jan. 1, 1992,
at 64. '
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Governmental concern over airline industry losses during the
time of the negotiation of NAFTA should not be underesti-
mated. President Clinton and Congress considered the losses to
be severe enough to warrant the creation of the National Com-
mission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (Na-
tional Commission). The stated goal of the National
Commission was "to develop a plan to improve the industry."9 5
Although the National Commission did not meet until May of
199396 (after the NAFTA provisions had been negotiated), the
concern for the airline industry must have existed well before
that date for the President and Congress to have appointed the
National Commission. Furthermore, in 1991, the year before
NAFTA's completion, the United States entered into a liberal
"open skies" agreement with Mexico, indicating that air trans-
portation between the two countries was a pressing concern dur-
ing NAFTA negotiations. 7
One should also recognize the importance of the airline in-
dustry's role in allowing the United States to reap the benefits of
trade with Mexico under NAFTA. One scholar notes,
International air transport services play an important role in
world trade. More than one billion passengers fly every year and
over twenty million tons of cargo are shipped by air annually. As
businesses further expand their operations internationally.., air
transport will become an even more crucial part of international
commerce.
98
Without a solid network of air transportation, removing restric-
tions on trade between nations would prove worthless. Only the
airline industry can insure that the benefits of NAFTA extend to
all regions of the United States. Thus it is crucial that the airline
industry remain prosperous. What better way to improve and
insure growth within the airline industry than to disallow re-
course in the event of a dispute.
94 NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG AND COMPETITIVE AIRLINE IN-
DUSTRY, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE CHANGE, CHALLENGE AND COMPETITION ii-2
(1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].
95 Hedlund, supra note 92, at 261.
96 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 94, at ii-2.
97 Chris Aspin, A Status Quo Maintained: Airlines Under a NAFTA, Bus. MExico,
June 1992, at 1.
98 Hedlund, supra note 92, at 259. The National Commission Report also
states that "[t] he principal challenge for our country is to fashion a new, growth-
oriented international aviation framework that allows U.S. airlines to use their
competitive strength and international air services to realize their full potential."
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 94, at 22.
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A. STEPs TowARD AN AVIATION AGREEMENT UNDER NAFTA:
THE CLINTON INITIATIVE
As United States businesses expand into Mexico, it is certain
that the United States will attempt to liberalize, to an even
greater extent, its bilateral agreement with Mexico. The United
States aviation policy, as expressed in the Clinton Administra-
tion's Initiative to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Indus-
try, proposes promoting growth in the airline industry in the
following four ways:
1) The United States will actively seek unrestricted multilat-
eral agreements with those groups of nations that are willing to
grant comparable benefits to U.S. carriers and to the U.S.
economy;
2) While the United States will pursue multilateral accords, it
will also seek to liberalize existing bilateral agreements;
3) The United States will vigorously defend all existing bilat-
eral rights and take appropriate actions where necessary;
4) The United States will explore the formation of a global
coalition of like-minded, free market nations that recognize the
benefits to citizens and national economies of expanded air
travel. 99
For purposes of detecting potential abuse, one should be espe-
cially interested in the relationship between strategies one, two,
and three above. Both one and two seek expansion of rights
under existing agreements for the benefit of the United States,
yet number three proposes to "vigorously defend" all rights
under existing bilateral agreements. 0 0 Is this representative of
the United States' position toward Mexico? The United States
and Mexico do have an existing bilateral agreement with respect
to the airline industry.10 1 According to the Clinton Initiative,
the United States will seek to expand its benefits by having Mex-
ico liberalize, while at the same time refusing to grant additional
benefits to Mexico. In other words, the United States will take
all that it can from Mexico and give nothing in return.
What is the link between the Clinton Initiative and the
NAFTA dispute resolution provisions? To begin, there is no
multilateral open skies agreement within NAFTA. The present
- Hedlund, supra note 92, at 285-86 (citing Transportation Secretary Federico
Pena, Speech at the Department of Transportation Briefing (Jan. 6, 1994) (tran-
script available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File)).
-o Id. at 286.
101 Aspin, supra note 97, at 1.
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bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico falls
outside the NAFTA framework and thus is not subject to the
dispute resolution provisions. But, the United States is currently
negotiating a bilateral aviation agreement with Canada.10 2 If
successful, the next logical step (keeping in mind strategy
number one above) would be to create a trilateral open skies
agreement under NAFTA between the United States, Canada,
and Mexico. 10 3
In fact, the creation of a trilateral aviation agreement under
NAFTA is very probable considering the United States' aviation
liberalization efforts within NAFTA's European counterpart, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The United
States did propose that the free trade rules of the GATT govern
the airline industries of member countries. 04 The initial idea
was to create a subsidiary agreement under the GATT, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), which would
give all members "free access to all countries in international
aviation."'' 0 5 The proposal lost its appeal, however, when airlines
realized that their access to countries might not necessarily in-
crease due to the GATT's system of granting some countries
most favored nation status. 10 6
Nevertheless, its does appear that the GATT may have a sound
solution for the defect in the initial proposal:
The GATT has distinguished between hard rights (like traffic
rights), and soft rights ("doing business" rights), and has decided
that GATS should include only the latter .... Andrew Card, De-
partment of Transportation Secretary, stated that 'liberalization
is coming to the air services and if an alternative vehicle to the
GATT/GATS is not developed, GATT trade principles eventually
will be applied to the trade in air services.""
102 Kevin 'Dougherty, Pressure Builds for New Air Deal with U.S., FIN. POST, Feb.
15, 1994, at 3.
103 NAFTA's four stated objectives are (1) to eliminate barriers; (2) promote
fair trade; (3) increase investment opportunities; and (4) facilitate further agree-
ments among the Parties (the "Parties" being the United States, Canada, and
Mexico). NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102. Keeping objective four in mind, it is
very likely that a trilateral agreement involving the airline industry will soon be in
the making.
104 Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International
Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 465 (1994).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. (footnotes omitted)
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Also, the United States may have rescinded its support for the
initial GATS plan for reasons other than the plan's failure to
ensure increased access for U.S.-based airlines. One such rea-
son is that, instead of taking a drastic measure like granting free
aviation access to all the GATT member countries, the United
States may have felt it was more reasonable to first "test the wa-
ters" by attempting a small-scale regional liberalization pack-
age.108 Such a plan would fit perfectly within the framework of
NAFTA.
Once the creation of this trilateral agreement is complete, it is
probable that, in light of the Clinton Initiative's determination
to vigorously defend all existing rights under bilateral treaties
(strategy number three above), the United States will maintain a
superior position under both U.S. law and NAFTA with respect
to aviation. This could occur by having a domestic aviation law
which is more restrictive than its NAFTA counterpart. Certain
notable areas of NAFTA already demonstrate restrictive treat-
ment under U.S. law and more liberal treatment under NAFTA.
Consider the following example in the area of copyright:
Contrary to U.S. law, under which copyright owners who fail to
register prior to the commencement of the infringing activity are
barred from recovery of either statutory damages or attorney's
fees, NAFIA provides no registration requirements for works
that seek copyright protection. This gap between NAFTA and
the United States domestic law may create practical difficulties
for copyright owners who must decide whether to register.10 9
A similar gap could potentially exist between a NAFTA aviation
agreement and a restrictive U.S. aviation law that is defended
"vigorously" with success. If such a gap were to occur, the
United States would be in a favorable position either way.
108 See id. Schless notes:
While the free trade principles of GAIT may provide a solution,
the industry in the meantime could experiment with multilateral-
ism on a regional or economic basis. "A more promising approach
would be to start with a liberal agreement among an initially small
group of like-minded countries and to permit other nations to join
when they are able to accept and honor the liberal trading rules set
out in that agreement." Other countries would see the benefits re-
sulting from this type of arrangement and would want their ailines
to participate in order to acquire those benefits.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
109 Kent S. Foster & Dean C. Alexander, Opportunities for Mexico, Canada and the
United States: A Summary of Intellectual Property Rights under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 67, 94 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
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Under NAFTA, the United States would have the advantages in-
herent in the dispute resolution process, while under U.S. law, it
would have the advantages of the rights retained from the previ-
ous bilateral treaty.
B. PROSPECTIVE RETENTION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE EXISTING
BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO
1. Restriction of Cabotage
One bilateral right that the United States may seek to defend
is the restriction of cabotage. Cabotage is defined as the car-
riage of any type of domestic traffic by a foreign airline between
two points in the same country. 1 0 An example of cabotage
would be a Mexican airline transporting passengers, cargo, or
mail between New York and Los Angeles. Until 1994, United
States law explicitly prohibited cabotage. 111 The* Code stated
that, "[f]oreign civil aircraft... shall not take on at any point
within the United States, persons, property, or mail carried for
compensation or hire and destined for another point within the
United States."'112 Even though cabotage is no longer explicitly
forbidden by statute, recent Code provisions do provide the Sec-
retary of Transportation with the discretion to prevent this type
of air carriage. 11 Since an aviation agreement has not yet been
proposed under NAFTA, the Secretary of Transportation's posi-
tion on cabotage is still unknown. Nevertheless, a decision to
forbid cabotage would not contravene either U.S. or interna-
tional law.
The United States has the right to forbid cabotage under Arti-
cle Seven of the Chicago Convention:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission
to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its terri-
tory passengers, mail, cargo carried for remuneration or hire and
destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting
State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which spe-
cifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any
110 Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANsp. L.J.
9, 29 (1991).
1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (1994).
112 Id.
11 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 41703 (1994).
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other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain any
such exclusive privilege from any other State.114
According to the language of article seven, a contracting State
may grant the privilege of cabotage to another State so long as
the privilege is not granted on an exclusive basis. Mexico thus
may grant the right of cabotage to the United States and Canada
without violating the requirements of the Chicago
Convention.115
The suggestion that Mexico may grant the right of cabotage
to the United States and Canada should come as no surprise.
Member States of the European Community, which outlawed
cabotage within their borders up until January of 1993, have
now instituted a liberalization package which plans for full cabo-
tage in the European, Community after the next four years.'
16
The need for this liberalization package is said to come from
"the establishment of the Single European Market and the de-
sire to facilitate the free movement of goods and services guar-
anteed by the EEC Treaty." 1 7 With the establishment of
NAFTA, the very same desire to facilitate free trade is in effect.
A consequent NAFTA liberalization package giving the United
States and Canada the right of cabotage could be expected in
the near future." 8 The question would then become: "Will the
14 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 7, 61 Stat.
1180, 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
15 Mexico is one of the 54 member countries of the Chicago Convention. Id.
at 1209. The other 53 countries include the following: Afghanistan, Australia,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, the Phillipines, Poland, Portugal,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela; and Yugoslavia. Id. at 1207-11. Note
that 9 of the remaining 51 countries (those other than existing NAFTA Parties)
are prospective NAFTA members.
116 EC Air Transport-The Third Liberalization Package Came Into Force on 1 Janu-
ary, AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS
File [hereinafter EC Air Transport].
117 Schless, supra note 104, at 453.
118 If such an agreement is initiated, the right of full cabotage is unlikely to be
immediate considering the time periods utilized in the European community.
[A] transition period of four years and three months will allow the
Member States to prepare for full cabotage within the continent.
In the meantime, Member States may authorize cabotage routes,
but are not required to do so until April 1, 1997. For now, EC
carriers may engage in consecutive cabotage. For example, Iberia,
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United States grant the same privilege to Mexico that it vowed to
vigorously defend to Mexico?"
The likely answer to this question would be "no," unless the
ownership rules of Mexican airlines change in the near future.
Although Mexico has nearly completed the task of fully privatiz-
ing its airline industry, much of the Mexican airline industry still
remains under state control. This presents some problems
when considering the prospect of granting Mexico full access to
United States skies:
If foreign governments' airlines are to be given direct access to
lucrative interior U.S. points in exchange for pricing flexibility
and other liberalizations, then both U.S. and foreign flag-carriers
must be free to play by the same rules. Most of the foreign carri-
ers, subsidized or owned by their governments, have inherent ad-
vantages over privately owned lines: while some are less efficient
than many private carriers, their governments will not allow them
to fall into the social Darwinian grave of bankruptcy. If the for-
eign airlines and/or their governments discriminate against U.S.
flag carriers or otherwise engage in anticompetitive conduct (the
pejorative term is 'unfair methods of competition'), then the
scales are loaded against the U.S. airlines.11 9
In order to ensure that the scales remain tipped in their favor,
United States airlines will certainly lobby to have the Secretary
of Transportation refuse to authorize cabotage within the
United States. 120
the Spanish flag-carrier, can transport passengers between Frank-
furt and Munich only if the flight originates in Spain (e.g., Madrid-
Frankfurt-Munich). On the Frankfurt-Munich leg, Iberia may sell
only fifty percent of the seats to domestic passengers. After April 1,
1997, airlines can engage in complete cabotage thus making the
European Community as a whole a single cabotage area.
Schless, supra note 104, at 453-54 (citations omitted).
119 PAUL S. DEMPSEY, LAw & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 384
(1987).
120 Some scholars point to the NAA-El Al (New York-Tel-Aviv) merger as an
indication that the United States is loosening cabotage restrictions. However,
there is some indication that the merger did not grant much control to El Al.
While El Al may hold the remaining interest, its capital contribu-
tion reflects that interest proportionately, with no outsize contribu-
tions suggesting a hidden quid pro quo and a corollary means of
control. Moreover, the concentration of the U.S. debt and equity
interest in a single individual suggest a much lesser power of con-
trol by the minority interest given similar opportunities, than if the
U.S. interest was dissipated among numerous stockholders and
lenders.
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2. Foreign Ownership
Another existing bilateral right that the United States may vig-
orously defend is the restriction on foreign ownership of Ameri-
can airlines. Only American citizens may own and operate a
United States air carrier.'21 To qualify as being owned and oper-
ated by a United States citizen, an American carrier's president
and at least two-thirds of its officers and board of directors must
be United States citizens. 122 Also, seventy-five percent of the vot-
ing stock must be held by persons who qualify as American na-
tionals. 123 Ownership of Mexican airlines is also limited.
United States investors are likely to test Mexico's restrictions
on foreign ownership first. This is evident from the present
surge in the number of foreign airlines seeking substantial
shares of American airlines in an attempt to gain ownership. 124
British Airways' recent attempt to acquire a large portion of
USAir was not allowed because of the veto power and subse-
quent control British Airways would have gained over the board
of USAir.125 Dutch airline KLM has managed to gain substantial
control of Northwest Airlines by acquiring a large share of its
parent company. 126 Perhaps most relevant to NAFTA, however,
is Air Canada's recent acquisition of twenty-four percent ($450
million worth) of the voting stock of Continental Airlines.1 27
Why test foreign ownership restrictions first? Because if an
investor from the United States can successfully obtain substan-
Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy into the Jet
Age, 26 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 143, 172 (1994) (quoting Application of North
American Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. ORDER No. 89-11-8 (Nov. 6, 1989)).
121 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 41102(a) (West 1995).
122 In reAcquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 91-1-41, 1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 55, at *5 [hereinafter Wings I1].
123 Id.
124 There is already substantial investment activity between U.S. and Mexican
airlines. United Airlines recently was the first airline to construct a state-of-the-art
terminal in the Mexico City airport. United. Airlines Moves to New Terminal MEx.
TRADE & L. REP., Nov. 1, 1993, at 6. It is interesting to note that a U.S. airline,
and not a Mexican airline, was the first to construct such a terminal.
125 James Ott, U.S. Sets Litmus Test for Foreign Investments, AVIATION WEL & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 4, 1993, at 30.
126 Wings II, supra note 122, at *21.
127 DOT Approves Air Canada/Air Partners Investment in Continental AntPORTS,
Jan. 12, 1993, at 14. Although this could indicate that the United States might be
willing to grant foreign ownership rights to a NAFTA contracting State, it should
be remembered that the playing field between the United States and Canada is
far more level than that between the United States and Mexico. Canada retains a
substantially better bargaining position than Mexico in its dealing with the
United States.
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tial control of a Mexican airline, the investor can effectively cir-
cumvent the cabotage rules of Mexico. 128
VI. -CONCLUSION
When administered in a legalistic manner without bias, dis-
pute resolution provisions can prove very effective in providing
weaker parties with a level playing field. Unfortunately, the dis-
pute resolution provisions of NAFTA are more pragmatic in na-
ture and thus should be viewed with suspicion. The NAFTA
dispute resolution provisions are even more alarming when con-
sidering the future airline business that may develop between
Mexico and the United States. The Clinton Initiative is clear in
its avowal to defend existing bilateral rights. With a possible tri-
lateral liberal skies agreement in the making under NAFTA,
Mexico could find itself losing nearly all control of its airline
industry. Furthermore, without the ability to arbitrate violations
fairly, Mexico will be without recourse.
The pragmatic nature of the NAFTA dispute resolution provi-
sions should ultimately be the main concern of Mexico and its
airline industry. The reality is that, although the Parties to the
Agreement sought to decrease the disparity of bargaining power
between the Parties by creating a dispute settlement mechanism,
the same disparity of bargaining power existed during the nego-
tiations of all NAFTA provisions. It is therefore not unreasona-
ble to suggest that the United States has secured an advantage
for itself and its citizens in both the dispute settlement provi-
sions and the provisions regarding the airline industry.
128 See Schless, supra note 104, at 458-59.
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